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  On September 11, 2001, a massive terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 
New York killed over 3,000 Americans. The markets plunged, and airline firms reeled 
towards bankruptcy. Executive action and legislation followed, both to stabilize the 
markets and to counter terrorism. One result was seven years of debate about inherent 
executive power, the nature and quality of emergency lawmaking by Congress, and the 
risks, benefits and harms of government action. 
  On September 18, 2008, after months of economic anxiety and several massive 
bailouts of distressed firms by the government, the stock market had its largest single-day 
drop since Sept. 11, 2001. Officials and commentators declared an economic emergency 
and moved on two fronts. The Treasury and Federal Reserve dusted off a 1932 statute 
and invoked the Fed’s authority to stabilize failing firms by lending them money, 
although some were allowed to fail. Nearly simultaneously, Treasury proposed 
emergency legislation granting the Secretary some $700 billion in spending authority to 
buy mortgage-related assets, with open-ended administrative discretion. After the plan 
was initially rejected by the House of Representatives, on September 29, the stock 
markets fell even more sharply than on September 18. Amid great political controversy 
and a mounting sense of crisis Congress passed a statute, the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008
1 (EESA), that not only approved the core of the Treasury’s 
request but granted it additional powers, with qualifications and oversight mechanisms of 
uncertain force and scope, and with many largely unrelated tax breaks thrown in to 
sweeten the pill. 
  Of these two crises, one involved “security,” one involved “finance” or 
“economics.” What are the similarities and differences? In positive terms, how did 
legislators and executive officials behave, and how did the public and elites react? 
Normatively, what do the two episodes show about the capacities of presidents, 
bureaucrats, legislators and judges to manage crises in the administrative state, and the 
rationality of their responses? And what of the legal issues common to both episodes, 
such as the scope of inherent executive power and the limits of congressional delegation 
– are the questions the same, and the answers? 
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  In what follows, we will argue that the two episodes were similar at the first 
decimal place, but interestingly different at the second, and we will attempt to explain 
both the similarities and differences. The first claim is that broad political processes and 
constraints operated similarly in both episodes to create a generally similar pattern of 
crisis governance and emergency lawmaking. In the modern administrative state, it is 
practically inevitable that legislators, judges and the public will, indeed must, entrust the 
executive branch with sweeping power to manage serious crises of this sort. Despite 
traditional concerns about excessive delegation of power to the executive, who may 
abuse that power or exploit it for unrelated ends, other actors have no real alternative in 
such cases. Political conditions and constraints, including demands for swift action by an 
aroused public, massive uncertainty, and awareness of their own ignorance, leave rational 
legislators and judges no real choice but to hand the reins to the executive and hope for 
the best. We will call this the “Schmittian view,” after the Weimar jurist Carl Schmitt, 
and we will argue that it offers a better picture of the functioning of the administrative 
state in crisis than the conventional “Madisonian view,” which holds that the executive 
can act only after public debate and Congressional authorization or can, at most, take 
interim emergency measures until Congress convenes. 
The Schmittian view sets outer bounds on political behavior in crises, but does not 
yield specific explanations of behavior within those bounds. Our second claim thus holds 
that, within the broad constraints of crisis politics, Congress and the administration had 
some freedom of action, and their actions differed in the two cases. Most notably, the 
Bush administration asserted its authority more aggressively after 9/11 than in the 
financial crisis. In the latter case it bowed to congressional supremacy and eschewed the 
claims of inherent and exclusive constitutional power it had used to defy statutes in the 
earlier episode. We argue that these variations in behavior within the constraints reflected 
rational choices on all sides, given differences in the background political conditions of 
2001 and 2008, particularly the Bush administration’s loss of popularity and credibility 
over this period. We therefore reject competing explanations based on differences in the 
applicable law, in crisis psychology, and other factors. 
  Part I describes each episode in turn, providing background, basic facts, and an 
overview of the legal issues. Part II, focusing on the first-decimal similarities, outlines the 
Schmittian view and suggests that it offers the best account of crisis management in the 
administrative state. Part III focuses on the second-decimal differences and explains them 
by reference to rational political behavior, given the actors’ preferences and political 
circumstances. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. Two Crises 
A. 9/11 and Its Aftermath 
  Large libraries have been written about 9/11 and its political, economic and legal 
consequences. We will offer a brief account that is unavoidably selective, picking out   4
details that are useful for our later claims.
2 In later sections, we offer a full treatment of 
the financial crisis, whose origins, nature and legal implications are largely unexplored. 
  Economically, the immediate consequences of 9/11 were a massive drop in the 
stock market, crippling losses in the airline and other transportation sectors, and 
widespread uncertainty. The Bush administration and Congress responded with a law that 
bailed out the airlines,
3 and the economic issues temporarily receded from center stage. 
Legally and politically, the main focus turned towards counterterror policies and, in 2003, 
the war in Iraq, which the administration sometimes linked to the counterterror issue. 
  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the legal framework for counterterrorism 
policy came, for the most part, from the Constitution and from two major statutes: the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force
4 enacted on September 17, 2001, and the USA 
PATRIOT Act,
5 enacted on October 26, 2001. In subsequent years new statutes were 
added, notably the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
6 the Military Commissions Act of 
2006,
7 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.
8 For present purposes, we focus on the 
AUMF and the Patriot Act, and their significance for theories of crisis management in the 
administrative state. 
  In some cases, the Bush administration initiated or pursued post-9/11 
counterterror policies based on claims of inherent executive power stemming from 
Article II of the Constitution, particularly the Commander-in-Chief clause. In other cases, 
however, the administration sought legislative authorization for its actions. The 
September 14, 2001 AUMF gave the administration broad authority to use “necessary 
and appropriate force” against Al Qaeda and related entities.
9 How broad this authority 
actually was became controversial in later years; a plurality of the Supreme Court 
eventually ruled that it authorized executive detention of enemy combatants,
10 yet in 
controversies over surveillance the administration’s attempts to invoke the statute were 
widely rejected.
11  
Civil-libertarian critics derided the “hasty” and “panicked” process by which the 
AUMF and the Patriot Act were passed, and portrayed them as massive delegations of 
unchecked power to the executive. The reality, however, was more complex. The 
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administration partially lost control of the legislative process in both cases, and although 
it got most of what it wanted, it did not by any means get everything it asked for. 
Measured from the baseline of the executive’s initial proposals, legislative pushback was 
substantial. However, the larger picture shows a grain of truth in the critics’ complaints: 
measured from the baseline of the legal status quo ante 9/11, the administration did 
receive large delegations of new powers in response to the crisis. 
What about the judges’ reaction? Here the picture fits a standard cyclical pattern 
in American history: courts remain quiet during the first flush of an emergency, and then 
reassert themselves, at least symbolically, as uncertainty fades and emotions cool. 
Between 2001 and 2004, the courts were conspicuously silent about counterterror policy. 
Indeed, in 2003 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case questioning the 
constitutionality of closed hearings in deportation proceedings, despite the existence of a 
circuit split on the issue
12 – in tension with the Court’s usual certiorari practice, and a 
clear example of Alexander Bickel’s “passive virtues.”
13 
In 2004, the Court for the first time reached the merits of a case about presidential 
authority over counterterror policy, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
14 Despite initial impressions 
that the Court had asserted itself against executive power, the administration won most of 
what it had wanted. Especially useful to the administration was the plurality’s holding 
that the September 14, 2001 AUMF authorized detention of alleged enemy combatants.
15 
Newspaper accounts and civil libertarians focused on a different holding, that 
constitutional due process might demand some minimum procedures to determine which 
detainees are actually enemy combatants.
16 However, the main opinion conspicuously 
declined to require that judicial process be used,
17 and the government constructed a 
system of administrative tribunals to make enemy-combatant determinations.
18 
By 2006, the Bush administration had lost a great deal of credibility both at home 
and (especially) abroad, in part because of setbacks in Iraq, in part because of scandals, 
such as Abu Ghraib, and in part because of spectacular incompetence in the management 
of Hurricane Katrina. Moreover, with the passage of time and the absence of new terrorist 
attacks in the homeland, the sense of threat waned. Predictably, the judges reasserted 
                                                 
12 See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 
1056 (2003).  
13 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS (1962).  
14 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
15 See id. at 517. 
16 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; Detainees; Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 
2004, at A1. 
17 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (“There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated 
could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”).  
18 See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy (July 7, 2004), 
available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (establishing Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals.)   6
themselves. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, the Court held that the administration’s 
military commissions set up to try alleged enemy combatants for war crimes violated 
relevant statutes and treaties.
19 When Congress reacted by passing the Military 
Commissions Act in 2006, the Court went on to hold in 2008, in Boumediene v. Bush, 
that the statute violated the Suspension Clause of the Constitution by denying habeas 
corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
20 Even in these cases, however, the Court did 
not actually order anyone released; in both cases, the result was simply more legal 
process. There remain sharp pragmatic limits on what courts are willing to do when faced 
with executive claims of security needs. 
B. The Financial Crisis 
1. The Origins of the Crisis 
  Financial crises are less familiar than security crises, and the September 2008 
financial crisis has been less studied than the conflict with Al Qaida, so we will provide a 
more detailed account of its background and development. 
  A financial crisis occurs when people stop extending credit to other people 
because they fear that the loans will not be repaid. Modern financial regulation emerged 
from the recognition that financial crises are inevitable in an unregulated market, and that 
they can lead to economic collapse, political instability, and widespread misery. Consider 
a typical bank. Banks are intermediaries that bring together creditors who have 
accumulated capital and want to save it (depositors and other savers) and borrowers who 
have insufficient capital for their purposes—consumers, who seek to purchase a durable 
good which they will enjoy over a period of time, and businesses, which seek to make 
investments. The bank takes funds from the creditors and extends them to the debtors, 
making its profits by charging a higher interest rate to the debtors than it pays to the 
creditors. 
  The bank attracts many of its creditors by giving them the right to withdraw their 
funds on demand; it attracts many of its debtors by permitting them the right to pay back 
over a long period of time. In normal times, creditors are constantly withdrawing and 
depositing but in aggregate they leave a relatively fixed sum in the bank’s coffers, so that 
the bank can turn it over to its long-term debtors without worrying that it will have to pay 
more funds to its creditors than it has on hand. The bank will keep some funds on hand—
a capital cushion—to ensure that it can cover small withdrawal spikes. If some event—
say, the closure of a local factory—causes a temporary increase in withdrawals, the bank 
can cover these withdrawals by borrowing from other banks with excess capital, while in 
the meantime slowing down its long-term lending if there is a general economic 
slowdown. The whole system works because depositors assume that banks will pay them 
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20 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).    7
back if they withdraw their money, banks assume that they can borrow from other banks, 
and so on. 
  A bank run occurs when depositors believe that the bank does not have enough 
funds to pay them back. A run typically occurs as a result of some real or rumored event 
that suggests that a bank may be, or become, insolvent. Suppose, for example, that people 
believe that a bank manager has embezzled funds from the bank, depleting its assets. A 
few risk-averse depositors withdraw their assets as a precaution, but when others hear 
about these withdrawals, they fear that the bank will not have enough funds left to cover 
their own withdrawals, and so forth, leading to a run. A run can be stopped if the bank 
can borrow from other banks or institutions; as people realize that the bank will honor 
their withdrawals, they feel less urgency about withdrawing. But if the rumored or real 
events reflect a systemic problem—suppose people believe that there is an economic 
downturn, which will lead to unemployment, which will lead to default by borrowers, 
which will prevent banks from covering withdrawals—all banks will be subject to runs, 
and so they will not be able to lend to each other. Indeed, banks may fear lending to a 
particular bank that is subject to a run because they believe that that bank will still lose all 
its depositors and thus be unable to repay the interbank loan. A collapse of banking can 
ensue. 
  The main implication is that the financial system can collapse merely because of a 
crisis of confidence, rather than because of some underlying economic problem. If 
everyone believes that all banks will fail, and withdraws his or her deposits, then all 
banks will fail. People put their money under their mattresses rather than in banks, which 
means that banks have no money to lend to consumers and businesses. The businesses 
cannot meet their payrolls and so must fire employees, who cannot repay their mortgages 
or buy goods from other businesses, and so forth. 
  These problems were widely recognized long ago; the modern system of banking 
regulation was finally put in place in the Great Depression, though it would continue to 
evolve. Essentially, the government acts as the lender of last resort: it guarantees that 
banks will have enough funds to cover deposits. This guarantee takes the form of deposit 
insurance as well as a more informal commitment by the central bank, the Fed, to lend 
money at low rates of interest to banks in financial distress. But the guarantee creates the 
problem of moral hazard: because banks that make risky decisions know that the 
government will rescue them if bad outcomes occur, while they enjoy the full payoff if 
the decisions turn out well, they have an incentive to engage in those risky decisions. So 
the government supervises banks; among other things, it requires them to maintain a 
certain level of capital, so that they can cover withdrawals most of the time. Various 
other restrictions have been imposed.
21 
                                                 
21 For an overview of regulation of financial institutions, see HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS 
JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1999).   8
  No one ever believed that the regulatory system was foolproof. Financial panics 
happen as a result of complicated economic and psychological factors that are hard to 
predict and control.
22 The Fed and other government institutions must exercise judgment 
when responding to them: if they are too aggressive, they exacerbate the problem of 
moral hazard and can produce other adverse economic effects; if they are not aggressive 
enough, financial crises will not be prevented or resolved. To some extent they are 
inevitable, and the financial crisis of 2008 was surely due in part to factors that simply 
cannot be controlled. 
  Otherwise, analysts identify a number of contributing factors to the 2008 crisis.
23 
Housing prices rose rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s, stimulated both by the rapid 
economic growth of that period, which made people optimistic about their employment 
prospects and future income, and by very risky lending to people without the financial 
wherewithal to repay their loans unless housing prices would continue to rise indefinitely. 
Thanks to innovations in the design of financial instruments, and to aggressive 
government support for mortgage lending, lenders could lend money and then sell the 
loan to others, who would bear the risk of nonpayment. The lenders thus had little 
incentive to ensure that the borrower was not too risky, and in many instances engaged in 
fraud to ensure that downstream buyers would believe that the borrower was less risky 
than he or she in fact was. The loans were pooled and securitized, which means that the 
streams of payments were divided up and packaged with other payment streams resulting 
from other loans; people could trade these rights. Traders may not have worried much 
about bad loans because they could diversify by purchasing different types of securities 
(they were classified according to risk) and adding them to portfolios that included other 
types of assets. And to the extent that traders did worry about the value of the mortgage-
backed securities they held, they could reduce the risk they faced (or so they thought) by 
engaging in credit default swaps, which were essentially insurance transactions, where a 
third party would promise to pay the counterparty if the latter’s mortgage-back securities 
lost value as a result of default on the underlying mortgages. These third parties would 
charge premiums to cover the risk they were taking on, and employed sophisticated 
trading strategies to minimize the risk that they took on—for example, short selling the 
securities of other holders of the mortgage-backed securities as mortgage default rates 
increased. 
                                                 
22 The economic literature contains two theories: one is that panics are random (see Douglas Diamond & 
Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Liquidity, and Deposit Insurance, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983)); the other is 
that they are due to asymmetric information (see Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of 
Banking Panics: Models, Facts and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109 
(R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1992)). 
23 See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Three Trends And a Train Wreck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at BU6 (“the three 
fundamental factors behind the crisis have been new wealth, an added willingness to take risk and a 
blindness to new forms of systematic risk”); Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis 
Since '30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (discussing various contributors).    9
  The securitization of mortgages was not a new phenomenon, and housing prices 
had risen and fallen before. The magnitude of the financial crisis was probably due to the 
trillion-plus dollar market in credit default swaps.
24 Investment banks would buy pools of 
mortgages and create instruments that gave buyers rights to various slices of the pooled 
revenue streams—say, just the principal on a certain class of subprime mortgage, or just 
the interest payments on another class of high-grade mortgage. Buyers of these 
instruments may not have fully understood their riskiness or how to price them; even if 
they did, many buyers had strong incentives to purchase them. An institution that 
purchased these instruments could evade minimum capital requirements and add 
enormous leverage to their portfolios, while regulators such as the SEC looked the other 
way.
25 This allowed them to make spectacular profits during boom times but threw them 
into insolvency when the boom times ended. 
  Housing prices peaked in 2005-2006. The collapse that followed could well have 
been a cyclical phenomenon—the standard bust that follows a boom when investors 
overestimate the demand for a product and overbuild. But easy credit for home buyers 
exacerbated the problem. As housing prices fell, mortgage holders found that they could 
not avoid default by selling their houses, which were sold in foreclosure. As foreclosure 
rates increased, the value of mortgage-backed securities fell. Investment banks that held 
mortgage-related securities were required, by mark-to-market regulations, to lower the 
value of these securities in their portfolios. As the value of their assets fell, these financial 
institutions became insolvent. They had hedged the risk by purchasing derivatives but 
these derivatives turned out to be worthless because counterparties also became insolvent. 
Banks did not have to mark down their mortgage-related assets but by the same token 
their own lenders could not price those assets, could not assume that the banks were 
creditworthy, and thus became reluctant to lend to them. As is always the case in 
financial crises, the government faced a dilemma. If it let firms fail, they would be 
appropriately punished for their excessively risky investments. But they would also bring 
down other firms, with the result that credit would dry up, and economic activity would 
be stifled. After some hesitation—Lehman was allowed to fail with disastrous short-term 
consequences because so many other firms had accounts with Lehman
26—the Fed and 
other government institutions began pumping liquidity into the system at unprecedented 
levels. They were apparently persuaded by the scale of the failures, the quite obvious 
                                                 
24  See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358.pdf). 
25 See Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced, & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed in an §85 Billion 
Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1; Floyd Norris, Out of the Shadows 
and Into the Harsh Light, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at C3; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight 
Flaws Fueled Collapse, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1. 
26 See Floyd Norris, After Weekend Full of Talks, No Sign of a Lending Thaw, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, 
at B1; Louise Story & Ben White, The Road to Lehman's Failure Was Littered With Lost Chances, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B1; Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
2, 2008, at A1.    10
contagion effect, and independent evidence of a credit crunch, such as the extremely high 
rate of interest that banks began to charge each other for interbank loans. 
  It soon became clear that a case-by-case approach would not be sufficient to 
address the financial crisis. For one thing, the financial crisis would require more 
resources than the Fed could supply. On September 19, Henry Paulson, the Treasury 
Secretary, submitted a bill to Congress that would authorize Treasury to borrow $700 
billion and use it to purchase mortgage-related assets. The bill provided that the 
Secretary’s purchasing decisions would be final, not subject to judicial review. Paulson 
apparently believed that by purchasing mortgage-related assets, the government would 
help reduce uncertainty about banks’ balance sheets, allowing them to borrow if they 
turned out to be solvent. Judicial review or other oversight would slow down this process 
when quick action was essential. 
  The boldness of the Secretary’s bill initially produced an enthusiastic reaction, 
and the financial markets rose, but quickly the reception turned sour. Critics argued that 
the bill was a “blank check” that gave the Treasury too much discretion and subjected it 
to too little oversight; that the bill favored the rich—the investment banks, their 
managers, their shareholders—at the expense of the taxpayer, while providing no relief to 
distressed homeowners; and that Secretary Paulson, with the support of Bernanke, sought 
to stampede Congress into action by holding out dire consequences if inaction occurred, 
rather than acknowledging that Congress should hold hearings, solicit the advice of 
independent experts, and deliberate.
27 
  House leaders of both parties, with the support of Paulson, President Bush, and 
both candidates for the presidency, greatly expanded the Paulson bill, partly in response 
to these criticisms, but on September 29, the House voted down the revised version by a 
vote of 228 to 205. The stock market crashed, with the Dow Jones Index falling by 778 
points. Senate leaders promptly took up the bill and overwhelmingly passed a revised 
version on October 1. The Senate version largely retained the provisions of the House bill 
but added numerous, mostly unrelated provisions designed to appeal to the marginal 
dissenters.  On October 3 this bill passed the House and was signed by the president.
28 
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
29 (EESA) differed from the 
Paulson bill in numerous ways. But most important, for our purposes, it did not reduce 
Treasury’s power to purchase mortgage-related securities; in fact, it expanded Treasury’s 
                                                 
27 See Letter from Professor Daron Acemoglu, et al., to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Sept. 24, 2008), available at  
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/john.cochrane/research/Papers/mortgage_protest.htm;  see also David M. 
Herszenhorn, Stephen Labaton, & Mark Landler, Democrats Set Conditions as Treasury Chief Rallies 
Support for Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at A1. 
28 See David M. Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1; Carl Hulse & Robert Pear, 
Adding Sweeteners, Senate Pushes Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A1.  
29 Pub. L. No. 110-343, div. A [hereinafter “EESA”].    11
power, authorizing it to purchase virtually any security when doing so could help resolve 
the financial crisis.
30 Democrats in Congress also sought to compel Treasury to regulate 
executive compensation and provide relief to homeowners subject to foreclosure in 
limited circumstances, but the authorities they gave Treasury were largely discretionary. 
EESA also provided for limited judicial review and set up various oversight mechanisms 
that, however, lacked coercive power. 
Even before Treasury put into operation its plan to purchase mortgage-related 
assets, it became clear that this approach would not be adequate, and Treasury announced 
that it would inject equity directly into financial institutions by buying preferred stock, as 
the Fed did with AIG. Meanwhile, the Fed was increasing the money supply, buying up 
commercial paper, and purchasing other assets that it traditionally left to the private 
markets. Treasury directed Fannie Mae and Sallie Mae to buy up mortgage-backed 
securities. The FDIC was brokering purchases of failed banks such as Wachovia,
31 and, 
citing its emergency statutory authority, it eliminated the $250,000 ceiling on deposit 
insurance and guaranteed virtually all newly issued senior unsecured debt, potentially 
exposing itself to more than $1 trillion in liability.
32 
2. Legal Issues 
  Actions Based on Existing Statutory Authority. The EESA was proposed and 
enacted in part to clarify the agencies’ statutory authority. Most of the actions taken by 
the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, and related agencies fit 
within existing statutory authorities, but not all did. The most legally questionable event 
was the bailout of AIG, which preceded the EESA’s passage. 
  AIG is the largest insurance company in the United States. When AIG was 
required to mark down its mortgage-related assets, and to make good on its obligations 
under its credit default swaps, it became insolvent. This meant that thousands of clients 
who believed that they had insurance against various adverse events suddenly could not 
expect to receive a full payout if those events occurred. Those clients would need to 
either self-insure, by liquidating assets, or to purchase additional insurance, which would 
also require liquidating assets, driving down their prices and contributing to the financial 
contagion.
33 
  The only way to stop financial contagions is to persuade creditors (the insurance 
clients) that they will be paid in full. With respect to banks, the government guarantees 
                                                 
30 See id. §§ 3, 103.  
31 Deborah Solomon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Bailout Plan Calms Markets, But Struggle Looms Over 
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deposits, and the Fed can step in and make loans to banks threatened by runs, so that 
creditors will not call in loans just because they fear similar action by other creditors. The 
same logic applies to an insurance company, and the Fed could, in principle, rescue AIG 
by making loans to it. The problem raised by the AIG case is that AIG was not a bank. 
The Fed normally lends to banks and not to other institutions. 
  However, a Depression-era statute gave the Fed the power to make loans to non-
banks in emergency conditions.
34 Citing this authority, the Fed made what it called a 
secured loan to AIG.
35 Under the terms of this transaction, AIG would borrow $85 billion 
over two years, at the rate of three-month LIBOR (the interest rate charged on interbank 
loans, which was three percent at the time of the transaction) plus 8.5 percent. All of 
AIG’s assets provided collateral for the loan; and the U.S. Treasury would end up the 
beneficiary of a trust holding 79.9 percent of AIG’s stock. Finally, the Fed replaced 
AIG’s CEO and obtained undisclosed rights to control the operation of the business.
36 
  Although a loan in form, the transaction was a purchase in substance: the Fed was 
given the incidents of ownership in the form of most of the stock. If the transaction was 
in substance a purchase of AIG, then it was not authorized by the statute, which permitted 
only loans. A complicating factor is that under the Chevron doctrine, courts generally 
defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutes they administer, at least if those 
interpretations are issued in a procedurally proper format.
37 A court might find that, in the 
circumstances, the Fed’s implicit interpretation of the statute to permit purchases of 
distressed non-bank firms in emergency conditions was reasonable. 
  The Nondelegation Doctrine and Nondelegation Canons. An even larger 
complicating factor, both in the AIG case and in the case of the EESA, involves the 
“nondelegation doctrine.” The doctrine holds that Congress must supply an intelligible 
principle to guide the policymaking discretion of agencies. Failing this, Congress has 
entrusted the agencies with legislative rather than executive power, in violation of Article 
I.
38 In practice, the nondelegation doctrine is largely moribund at the level of 
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constitutional law; it was invoked to invalidate legislation for the first time in 1935, and 
for the last time in 1936.
39 At the level of statutory interpretation, however, the doctrine is 
occasionally invoked as an interpretive canon, in which agency authority is construed 
narrowly in order to avoid the constitutional question of nondelegation.
40 
 Treasury’s  initial  proposal  would have granted the Secretary sweeping authority 
largely without explicit standards and without any judicial review. The final version of 
the EESA actually expanded the Secretary’s authority along important margins, although 
it also introduced some oversight mechanisms and some judicial review, as we will 
discuss below. Given the breadth of authority it delegates, a colorable nondelegation 
challenge might be made against the EESA. A challenge of that sort might emphasize 
that, when the Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935, it 
described the statute as granting the President power over the entire national economy, 
essentially enabling an economic dictatorship.
41 Perhaps the EESA is not entirely 
dissimilar, at least in the sense that the EESA will affect the entire economy, directly or 
indirectly, and that the power to spend $700 billion or more
42 represents a large-ish chunk 
of money and discretionary authority for any one administrator to possess. Furthermore, 
the Court’s last major pronouncement on the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, 
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
43 articulated a sliding-scale approach, 
under which a delegation conferring greater discretion requires more clarity and 
specificity in its guiding principles.
44 
For several reasons, however, such a challenge is highly unlikely to succeed. 
First, the enacted statute contains more in the way of explicit intelligible principles and 
standards than did the initial proposal. The main purpose is to “immediately provide 
authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and 
stability to the financial system of the United States.”
45 Whether or not the grant of such 
authority or its exercise will have those effects, the statute’s purpose is perfectly 
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intelligible. And the statute contains an explicit list of rather detailed “considerations” 
that the Secretary must take into account when exercising his authority.
46  
Second, courts have sometimes read legislation to contain implicit standards, 
drawn from the legislative background and statutory purposes, in order to pretermit a 
nondelegation challenge,
47 and that course of action would seem highly probable with 
respect to the EESA, even if the statute’s explicit standards are insufficient. Courts might 
read the legislation to implicitly embody a general intelligible principle that the 
Secretary’s powers is to be used in order to promote liquidity, to raise confidence, to 
dampen uncertainty, to stabilize markets, or some mix of all of these. The legislative 
history is of course extremely thin, as is usually the case with emergency statutes, but the 
broader legislative background contains ample references to these and related ideas. 
Third, any of these standards and principles would make the EESA at least as 
intelligible as other statutes the Court has upheld against nondelegation challenge. These 
include statutes giving agencies power to regulate “in the public interest” and, most 
recently, in Whitman, a statute giving EPA the authority to regulate pollutants in a 
manner “requisite to protect the public health.”
48 If such precedents are any guide, it is 
unlikely in the extreme that the Court would invalidate the EESA on nondelegation 
grounds. 
That said, the nondelegation canon might be invoked at the level of statutory 
interpretation. In the case of the EESA the Treasury’s substantive authority is quite clear, 
so the more likely use of the nondelegation canon would be to narrow the Fed’s authority 
under the 1932 statute used to “loan” money to AIG. In recent cases, the Court has 
refused to construe ambiguous statutes, and even not-so-ambiguous statutes, to give 
agencies discretion over “major questions” of policy
49; a clear statement from Congress is 
said to be necessary in such circumstances. Indeed, is possible that lingering concerns 
over the legal status of the AIG bailout, for which statutory authority was somewhat 
ambiguous, were part of the impetus for the EESA. The statute gives the Treasury clear 
authority to make purchases from distressed firms, whereas the Fed has such authority 
only under a flexible reading of the 1932 law. 
  Judicial Review. The Secretary’s initial proposal would have precluded any 
judicial review of his discretionary decisions under the statute. Lawyers and others 
reacted by saying that the preclusion would give the Secretary unchecked power; they 
meant power with no legal checks, although political checks would continue to operate. 
In response, the enacted version of the legislation provided for standard APA-style 
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arbitrariness review. However, in an example of “studied ambiguity”
50 or simply out of 
haste, the statute also prohibited injunctions or other equitable relief against the 
Secretary’s actions under some of the main provisions of the Act, despite the fact that 
APA-style review is itself equitable.
51 A plausible reconciliation of these provisions is 
that Congress merely intended to bar parties from obtaining advance relief against the 
Secretary’s decisions, while still allowing parties to obtain relief after the fact, but this is 
hardly pellucid. 
  So the judicial review provisions of the EESA are confusing, but it is clear that 
the statute provides for more than zero judicial review, in contrast to the initial proposal. 
For present purposes, the availability of at least some review has a double significance. 
First, there is the question how much judicial oversight the review provisions will enable, 
in practice; we take up that issue in Part II, suggesting that judicial review under the 
EESA will quite predictably prove highly deferential. 
Second, the availability, or not, of judicial review might be a factor in the 
nondelegation analysis. At least on an older view, judicial review helps to ensure against 
arbitrary administrative action and thereby substitutes for legislative oversight.
52 The 
absence of review would exacerbate any nondelegation problems, but the availability of 
review under the actual legislation would be yet another reason for thinking that a 
constitutional nondelegation challenge would make little headway. However, all this may 
be a red herring in any event. A view with more recent support is that nondelegation is 
strictly a question about whether the relevant statute creates a substantive intelligible 
principle to guide the executive; judicial review is a separate question, one that is neither 
here nor there. Although the latter view is implicitly suggested by the logic of Whitman 
v. American Trucking, the Court has not issued a clear statement about the question.
53  
II. Crisis Management in the Administrative State: A Schmittian View 
  Against this legal and economic background, what explains how institutions and 
actors behaved? Many discussions of crisis management and emergency lawmaking have 
two main flaws. First, they focus on historical episodes from the Civil War or earlier, 
overlooking that the central problems of crisis management today involve the role of the 
administrative state. By contrast, we will focus on a nearly synchronic comparison 
between the 9/11 crisis and its aftermath, on the one hand, and the 2008 financial crisis, 
on the other. In both episodes, administrative agencies have been central actors. 
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Secondly, even discussions that do take account of the administrative state tend to 
ignore political constraints. They ask how authority to manage crises should be allocated 
among Congress, the President, executive agencies, independent agencies, and the courts, 
as though all possible choices are on the table and everything is up for grabs. We will 
suggest, to the contrary, that the beginning of wisdom on this subject is to recognize the 
tight constraints that the possible places on the desirable. Ought implies can; before 
asking what authority institutions ought to have to manage crises, we must ask what their 
capacities are, and what allocations of authority are feasible given those capacities.  
This sort of analysis will have indirect normative implications, but largely 
negative ones. In this Part, we will argue that the conditions of the administrative state 
make it practically inevitable that the executive and the agencies will be the main crisis 
managers, with legislatures and courts reduced to adjusting the government’s response at 
the margins and carping from the sidelines. Congress and the courts suffer from crippling 
institutional debilities as crisis managers; legislators and judges are aware of this, and do 
what they have no real choice but to do, which is delegate sweeping power to the 
executive to cope with the crisis. In Part III, we will go on to explain how officials 
behaved, within the broad constraints we have identified. In particular, we ask whether 
officials acted irrationally in these episodes, given their political circumstances; our 
answer is no. 
A. Common Features 
  The preconditions for both crises developed through the ordinary workings of 
history, well before the crises burst onto the scene. The 9/11 security crisis can be traced 
to the 1991 Gulf War, when Saudi Arabia turned down Osama bin Laden’s offer of 
protection from Iraq, which had just invaded Kuwait, and accepted American protection; 
other complex foreign policy decisions related to the United State’s engagement in the 
middle east also contributed to the conflict with Al Qaida. The 2008 financial crisis also 
has nearer and more distant origins. The vulnerability of the financial system to the 
housing bubble had a tangle of causes, including deregulation and lax oversight going 
back to the 1990s, the globalization of the financial system as a result of technological 
innovation, and the invention of sophisticated financial instruments that allowed investors 
to spread their risks but that also had the effect of increasing systemic risk. 
  In both cases, the crisis began when events—the 9/11 attack, the failure of 
numerous large financial institutions in a short time period—revealed the existence of a 
serious threat to security in one case and to economic well-being in the other. 
Government officials and private observers had for a long time understood that Al Qaida 
could launch a devastating terrorist attack and that turmoil in the housing and subprime 
mortgage markets could lead to a financial meltdown, but the dangers in both cases were 
highly uncertain, and elected officials could not be persuaded to devote significant   17
resources to these problems.
54 The crisis revealed the extent of the danger and the 
executive branch responded with alacrity. 
  In both cases, at the onset of the crisis the executive acted immediately and 
sought authorization from Congress. In the 9/11 crisis, the Bush administration shut down 
air travel, directed security personnel to guard against further attacks, swept up thousands 
of undocumented aliens from Muslim countries, and engaged in ethnic profiling. 
Meanwhile, it went to Congress and obtained a very broad delegation—the Authorization 
to Use Military Force—which would allow it to engage in combat operations against 
suspected members of Al Qaida and affiliated groups around the world, and to launch an 
invasion of Afghanistan. It also submitted the Patriot Act to Congress, which would give 
law enforcement officials various search and surveillance tools. Notably, the Bush 
administration also defied several existing statutory schemes rather than seeking to have 
them changed: the ban on torture, restrictions on surveillance in FISA, and (arguably) a 
law against detention of U.S. citizens. 
  In the financial crisis, the Bush administration—including the Federal Reserve 
Board, a legally independent agency that acted in close collaboration with the Treasury—
also relied heavily on statutory authorities. The bailouts of Fannie Mae, Sallie Mae, Bear 
Stearns, and AIG were conducted pursuant to statutes that authorize the Fed to make 
loans to banks and, in emergencies, other businesses whose failure threatens the health of 
the financial system. But the Bush administration also submitted a bill to Congress that 
would give Treasury power to purchase mortgage-related assets from distressed firms, 
including the authority to spend up to $700 billion for this purpose. Congress initially 
rejected the bill, but a modified version that gave Treasury more power than it initially 
sought, albeit subject to greater oversight as well, was enacted only two weeks after the 
Bush administration’s proposal was sent to Congress. 
  Overall, the politics of the two crises had four major features in common. First, a 
publicly observable event occurred. In 2001, four planes were hijacked, and three crashed 
into buildings, killing more than 3,000 people. In 2008, highly visible financial 
institutions with household names collapsed or teetered on the abyss, the stock market 
plunged, and various indicators of the ill health of credit markets reached unprecedented 
levels.
55 Second, the events revealed a threat about which ordinary people and many 
experts previously knew little or nothing. The visibility of the threat confirmed, for 
ordinary people, the nature of the threat to which experts testified. Third, the threat 
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revealed by the crisis was complex and ambiguous, and the proper response to the threat 
was highly uncertain. Only experts could really understand the threat—perhaps only 
experts with security clearances or access to privileged information. However, the experts 
disagreed among themselves and could not adequately explain their views to the public or 
even to politicians. Fourth, and related, a general view emerged that the executive needed 
additional discretion (as well as resources) in order to address the threat adequately. This 
view held that Congress must grant new authority or relax existing constraints on 
executive action. And Congress did in fact do so, delegating sweeping new powers to the 
executive, although with some qualifications at the margin and with oversight 
mechanisms of uncertain force. 
B. The Schmittian View  
Why do crises pose distinctive problems for democratic governance? One might 
deny that they do. On this view, crises do not belong in a category of their own; they are 
just the endpoint of a continuum along which the magnitude of a threat increases. 
Ordinary criminal behavior can have devastating effects but no one believes that its 
existence creates a crisis. Police, prosecutors, and other executive officials are given 
some discretion, but their statutory authority is circumscribed and their decisions are 
subjected to ordinary judicial review. The emergence of a terrorist threat is, like the crack 
epidemic, just a new type of criminal problem, necessitating perhaps increased resources 
for the police and the construction of prisons, but not any significant change in how the 
legal system operates.  
Similarly, one might point out that the economy always experiences “too much” 
or “too little” lending, against some baseline of optimal social welfare. Institutions are set 
up to inject and extract liquidity as circumstances warrant, and to ensure that creditors 
and debtors do not exploit these types of government intervention in a manner that harms 
public welfare. A financial crisis is just the extreme end of a continuum of liquidity, 
requiring perhaps greater resources but no real change in the operation of institutions. 
Whatever the merits of that view, this is not what happens during crises. Instead, 
fundamental institutional reform takes place in a brief period of time even as existing 
institutions struggle to fulfill their mandate. Sometimes, existing institutions simply claim 
more power than it was understood that they had. At other times, Congress rouses itself 
to act, but only for the purpose of confirming a seizure of power or discretion by the 
executive, or in order to delegate large new powers. Our goal is to understand these 
dynamics. 
To do so, we turn to the best general analysis of institutional capacities and crisis 
management in the administrative state, stemming from Carl Schmitt. A main theme in 
Schmitt’s work involves the relationship between the classical rule-of-law state, featuring 
legislative enactment of general rules enforced by courts, and the administrative state, 
featuring discretionary authority and ad hoc programs, administered by the executive,   19
affecting particular individuals and firms. We do not need, and will dispense with, some 
of Schmitt’s more jurisprudential and abstract claims and concerns, such as his critique of 
legal positivism. Rendered in suitably pragmatic terms, Schmitt’s work contains essential 
insights for understanding how Congress, the courts and the executive can and cannot 
manage crises, economic or otherwise. 
Here the main inspiration is not solely Schmitt’s famous work on emergencies, on 
“the exception” as opposed to normal law, or his famous pronouncement that “sovereign 
is he who decides on the exception.”
56 Although we will draw on those themes when 
relevant, we also draw on Schmitt’s analysis of the general debility of legislatures and 
judges in the modern administrative state, not only in times of war but also or especially 
in economic crises.
57 Such crises underscore legislative debility, making it plain for all to 
observe, but the causes of the debility are structural. 
The nub of Schmitt’s view is his idea that liberal lawmaking institutions, such as 
legislatures and courts, “come too late” to crises in the modern state. Those institutions 
frame general norms that are essentially “oriented to the past,” whereas “the dictates of 
modern interventionist politics cry out for a legal system conducive to a present- and 
future-oriented steering of complex, ever-changing economic scenarios.”
58 Legislatures 
and courts, then, are continually behind the pace of events in the administrative state; 
they play an essentially reactive and marginal role.  
Legislatures may be asked to delegate new authority to administrators after a 
crisis is already underway, but the frontline response is inevitably administrative, and the 
posture in which legislators are asked typically to grant new delegations of authority, 
with the crisis looming or in full blast, all but ensures that legislators will give the 
executive much of what it asks for. Courts, for their part, get involved only much later, if 
at all, and essentially do mop-up work after the main administrative programs and 
responses have solved the crisis, or not. The result is that in the administrative state, 
broad delegations to executive organs will combine lawmaking powers with 
administrative powers; “only then can the temporal distance between legislation and legal 
application be reduced[.]”
59 
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These points are abstract. We illustrate them by examining the role of Congress in 
the aftermath of 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis. Our main claim will be that the 
Schmittian view supplies a better account of Congress’ behavior in these crisis episodes 
than do competing views. 
C. Congress 
  Madisonians describe Congress as the deliberative institution par excellence. On 
this view, Congress is a summation of local majorities, bringing local information and 
diverse perspectives to national issues. The bicameral structure of Congress aids 
deliberation; the House shifts rapidly in response to changing conditions and national 
moods, while the Senate provides a long-term perspective, and cools off overheated or 
panicky legislation. 
  It is unclear whether the Madisonian account is best taken to describe 
congressional action in normal times, in times of (perceived) crisis, or both, although the 
Madisonian emphasis on the cooling-off function of the Senate is clearly intended as a 
check on executive claims that an emergency is at hand. Whatever the case, the 
application of the Madisonian view to crises or emergencies is the default position among 
legal academics. On this view, even in crisis situations the executive may act only on the 
basis of clear congressional authorization that follows public deliberation, and the 
executive’s actions must presumptively be subject to judicial review. A proviso to the 
Madisonian view is that if immediate action is literally necessary, the executive may act, 
but only until Congress can convene to deliberate; if the executive’s interim actions were 
illegal, it must seek ratification from Congress and the public after the fact.
60 In our view, 
by contrast, if we take current institutions as they are – thereby bracketing proposals for 
either large-scale constitutional reform
61 or for small-scale, feasible improvements to 
Congress’ design and procedures
62 – the Madisonian vision of Congress seems 
hopelessly optimistic in times of crisis. 
  On Schmitt’s view, the deliberative aspirations of classical parliamentary 
democracy have become a transparent sham under modern conditions of party discipline, 
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interest-group conflict and a rapidly changing economic and technical environment. 
Rather than deliberate, legislators bargain, largely along partisan lines. Discussion on the 
legislative floor, if it even occurs, is carefully orchestrated posturing for public 
consumption, while the real work goes on behind closed doors, in party caucuses. 
  How does this picture relate to Schmitt’s point that legislatures invariably “come 
too late” to a crisis? The basic dilemma, for legislatures, is that before a crisis they lack 
the motivation and information to provide for it in advance, while after the crisis has 
occurred, they have no capacity to manage it themselves. We will describe each horn of 
the dilemma in detail. 
In the pre-crisis state, legislatures mired in partisan conflict about ordinary 
politics lack the motivation to address long-term problems. Legislation at this point 
would act from behind a veil of uncertainty about the future, and might thus prove 
relatively impartial; at least high uncertainty would obscure the distributive effects of the 
legislation for the future, and thus reduce partisan opposition. However, by virtue of these 
very facts, there is no strong partisan support for the legislation, and no bloc of legislators 
has powerful incentives to push it onto the crowded legislative agenda. The very 
impartiality that makes ex ante legislation relatively attractive, from a Madisonian 
perspective, also reduces the motivation to enact it. 
This point is entirely independent of Schmitt’s claim about the norm and the 
exception. In a modern rendition, that claim holds that ex ante legal rules cannot regulate 
crises in advance, because unanticipated events will invariably arise. Legislatures 
therefore either decline to regulate in advance or enact emergency statutes with vague 
standards that defy judicial enforcement ex post.
63 Here, however, a different point is at 
issue: even if ex ante legal rules could perfectly anticipate all future events, legislatures 
will often lack the incentive to adopt them in advance. Occasionally, when a high-water 
mark of public outrage against the executive is reached, legislatures do adopt framework 
statutes that attempt to regulate executive behavior ex ante; several statutes of this kind 
were adopted after Watergate. The problem is that new presidents arrive, the political 
coalitions that produced the framework statute come apart as new issues emerge, and 
public outrage against executive abuses cools. Congress soon relapses into passivity and 
cannot sustain the will to enforce, ex post, the rules set out in the framework statutes. The 
post-Watergate framework statutes have thus, for the most part, proven to impose little 
constraint on executive action in crisis, in large part because Congress lacks the 
motivation to enforce them.
64  
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The other horn of the dilemma arises after the crisis has begun to unfold. Because 
of their numerous memberships, elaborate procedures and internal structures, such as 
bicameralism and the committee system, legislatures can rarely act swiftly and decisively 
as events unfold. The very complexity and diversity that make legislatures the best 
deliberators, from a Madisonian perspective, also raise the opportunity costs of 
deliberation during crises and disable legislatures from decisively managing rapidly 
changing conditions. After 9/11, everyone realized that another attack might be 
imminent; only an immediate, massive response could forestall it. In September 2008, the 
financial markets needed immediate reassurance: only credible announcements from 
government agencies that they would provide massive liquidity could supply such 
reassurance. Indeed, though commentators unanimously urged Congress to take its time 
with the Paulson plan,
65 within weeks the Bush administration was being criticized for 
not acting quickly enough. In such circumstances, legislatures are constrained to a 
reactive role, at most modifying the executive’s response at the margins, but not 
themselves making basic policy choices. 
  The main implication of this dilemma is that crises in the administrative state tend 
to follow a similar pattern. In the first stage, there is an unanticipated event requiring 
immediate action. Executive and administrative officials will necessarily take 
responsibility for the front-line response; typically, when asked to cite their legal 
authority for doing so, they will either resort to vague claims of inherent power or will 
offer creative readings of old statutes. Because legislatures come too late to the scene, old 
statutes enacted in different circumstances, and for different reasons, are typically all that 
administrators have to work with in the initial stages of a crisis. “Over time, the size and 
complexity of the economy will outgrow the sophistication of static financial safety 
buffers”
66—a comment that can also be made about static security safety buffers, which 
the advance of weapons technology renders obsolete. In this sense, administrators also 
“come too late” – they are forced to “base decisions about the complex, ever-changing 
dynamics of contemporary economic [and, we add, security] conditions on legal relics 
from an oftentimes distant past.”
67  
Thus Franklin Roosevelt regulated banks, in 1933, by offering a creative reading 
of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, a statute that needless to say was enacted 
with different problems in mind.
68 Likewise, when in 2008 it became apparent on short 
notice that the insurance giant AIG had to be bailed out, lest a systemwide meltdown 
occur, the Treasury and Federal Reserve had to proceed through a strained reading of a 
                                                 
65 See, e.g., Letter from Professor Daron Acemoglu, et al., supra note 27. 
66 Robert F. Bruner & Sean D. Carr, Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 1907, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
115, 120 (2007). 
67 Scheuerman, supra note 57, at 1887.  
68 See Michel R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 71-73 
(1983).   23
hoary 1932 statute, as we discussed in Part I. While the statute authorized “loans,” it did 
not authorize government to purchase private firms; administrators structured a 
transaction that in effect accomplished a purchase in the form of a loan. The pattern holds 
for security matters as well as economic issues, and for issues at the intersection of the 
two domains. Thus after 9/11, the Bush administration’s attempts to choke off Al 
Qaeda’s funding initially proceeded in part under provisions of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act,
69 a 1977 statute whose purpose, when enacted, was 
actually to restrict the President’s power to seize property in times of crisis.
70 
  Crisis and delegation.
71 In the second stage, Congress writes new statutes 
delegating broad powers to the executive to handle the crisis. It is simplistic to say, and 
we do not claim, that legislatures write the executive a blank check. On the other hand, it 
is equally false to say that during crises, Congress acts as a Madisonian deliberator, with 
institutions like bicameralism cooling of the heated passions of the public and of 
executive officials. The basic pattern is that the executive asks to take three steps 
forward; Congress, pushing back somewhat, has no choice but to allow it to take two. We 
will examine both parts of this pattern. 
After the initial wave of strictly administrative response based on old statutes or 
vague claims of inherent authority, the executive asks Congress to delegate new powers. 
Executive proposals are typically sweeping, perhaps because the executive has private 
information about the magnitude of the crisis that it cannot fully convey to Congress, or 
because the executive uses the crisis as an opportunity to enlarge its power, or because 
the executive, anticipating a bargaining game with senior legislators, stakes out an 
extreme position – perhaps more extreme than the executive itself actually desires – so as 
to be well-positioned to make concessions.  
Once the proposal is submitted to Congress, bargaining results, perhaps on a very 
compressed time-table. Large delegations are usually enacted quickly, and critics tend to 
complain of hasty or panicked lawmaking, although the critics often overlook the 
opportunity costs of deliberation, which rise in times of crisis.
72 Here, suffice it to say 
that the speed of legislative enactment in such cases does not at all mean that the 
executive gets whatever it wants. What matters in (legislative) bargaining is not the 
parties’ absolute haste, but their relative impatience. If the executive is even more 
impatient to enjoy the fruits of agreement than are legislators, or even more fearful of the 
consequences of nonagreement, then the executive will tend to make some concessions. 
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Executives might be relatively more impatient than legislators because they need to show 
decisive leadership, because the public will hold them responsible for disasters, 
regardless of the legal situation, or because the political costs of bargaining failure are 
spread over many legislators, while executive officials each incur a large share of 
opprobrium. 
All of these dynamics were on display in the bargaining over the AUMF, over the 
Patriot Act, and over the EESA. In the first case, the White House initially proposed a 
blank-check delegation to the President of power to respond as appropriate to “deter and 
preempt terrorism.”
73 The bargaining, although accomplished in a matter of days, ended 
up introducing a more restrictive nexus test, which limited the President’s authority to the 
use of force against entities that had aided the 9/11 attacks.
74 In the case of the Patriot 
Act, a rebellion by civil-libertarian Republican legislators in the House caused the 
administration to temporarily lose control of the bargaining process, resulting in a 
reduced grant of powers combined with a sunset provision.
75  
In the case of the EESA, the administration’s initial plan was sketchy in the 
extreme, and would have granted legally unreviewable power to the Secretary of the 
Treasury to spend some $700 billion dollars on the acquisition of mortgage-related assets, 
essentially without legislative standards. Rebellious House Republicans rejected one 
version of the bill, but the final legislation retained the core of the administration’s 
proposal, while modifying it on several margins. The statute actually gave the Secretary 
additional new powers that the administration had not requested or perhaps even desired, 
such as the powers to buy an equity stake in distressed firms and to regulate executive 
pay. The former power would allow the Treasury to “nationalize” banks—that is, take 
them over and operate them. On the other hand, several oversight mechanisms were 
introduced, although as we will discuss shortly, their effectiveness is questionable. 
Finally, the legislation introduced some new substantive restrictions on the Secretary’s 
new authority, and provided for staggered disbursement of the funds in a fashion 
reminiscent of the Patriot Act’s sunset provisions.  
In all these cases, the approximate result was the same. Measured either from the 
baseline of (1) what the executive initially requested or (2) what the executive actually 
desired (as best we can tell from indirect evidence), Congress pushed back substantially, 
despite the speed of legislative enactment; it narrowed proposed delegations or added 
delegations that the administration did not desire, added sunset provisions or similar 
mechanisms, and created oversight mechanisms. These points should not obscure, 
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however, that measured from the baseline of (3) the legal status quo ante the emergency, 
executives obtained broad new delegations of power. After the AUMF, the President 
possessed a great deal of statutory authority to combat terrorism, especially abroad; after 
the Patriot Act, that authority was extended to domestic criminal law and immigration 
matters; after the EESA, the President enjoyed broad statutory authority to rescue the 
economy from crisis. 
The upshot is that in cases of emergency lawmaking, Congress lets the executive 
have most, although not all, of what it wants. Legislators have no real choice but to do so. 
In perceived crises, the status quo is unacceptable, but the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives to the status quo are highly uncertain; indeed the alternatives themselves are 
usually ill-defined. Congress’ usual built-in advantage – inertia, or the ability of 
legislative leaders and interest groups to kill proposals at vetogates and thereby do 
nothing at all – is ruled out by politics. Congress can modify and push back to a degree, 
but the public, motivated by some mix of fear, urgency, and rational apprehension, 
demands that something be done. 
In this situation, the executive has enormous inherent advantages. Where inaction 
is not an option, the executive’s proposal is a natural focal point. The ability to move first 
by framing a proposal and putting it on the congressional agenda determines the contours 
of the subsequent bargaining game, even if Congress modifies the executive’s proposal 
substantially. Legislators may be frustrated with the thrust of the executive’s proposal, 
not merely the details, but be unable to find an alternative, or unable to force public 
attention onto their preferred alternative, out of the welter of suggestions and 
possibilities. Either where there are no alternatives or where there are too many, the 
executive’s proposal will stand out. 
Perhaps most of all, key legislators fear being stamped as obstructionists who 
have prevented the executive from taking necessary measures. The very nature of crisis 
bargaining implies that legislative leaders will become especially visible – there is no 
time for wide consultation of the rank-and-file – so the leaders’ potential responsibility is 
heightened. Furthermore, legislative leaders can do something to focus public attention 
on back-benchers who threaten to scuttle a deal. In 2008, when the EESA came up for a 
second (and presumably final) vote in the House, leaders trumpeted to the public that 
everything depended on whether House Republican back-benchers would go along
76 – 
leaving the latter in the uncomfortable position of being the last obstacle to the 
emergency measures. 
As we have mentioned, these effects are somewhat diluted because blame can be 
spread over a collective legislature, ensuring that individuals have reduced responsibility. 
Thus when the first version of the EESA was voted down in the House, one Republican 
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legislator remarked that the first choice of his colleagues was to have the bill pass while 
voting against it.
77 The problem, as the event showed, was that because too many 
legislators acted on this preference, the bill did not pass at all. Ultimately, how these 
opposing forces working for and against broad delegation net out in particular cases of 
emergency lawmaking cannot be settled in the abstract, but only by looking at a series of 
cases. The pattern of recent history is clear enough: although legislators do push back 
against executive demands, in the end they accede to the core of the executive’s 
proposals, both as to security matters and financial ones.   
These causal claims about the politics of emergency lawmaking do not imply that 
legislators delegate “too much” power in crises. A hypothetical rational legislator, given 
emergency conditions, might delegate the same amount of power as an actual legislator 
buffeted by emotions and political winds. In Part III, we take up the question of the 
rationality of emergency delegations. Here, we merely note that political forces make 
large-scale delegation all but inevitable in such cases, although it is also true that the 
executive never gets all that it asks for or even all that it wants. 
  The irrelevance of divided government. How important is divided government in 
crisis bargaining over delegation? Whatever the importance of divided government in 
normal times,
78 the partisan composition of Congress and the executive is of reduced 
importance in emergencies, or so the evidence suggests. In the bargaining over the Patriot 
Act, the administration lost control of Republican back-benchers in the House, who were 
concerned about civil liberties. In the bargaining over the EESA in September 2008, the 
administration lost control of Republican back-benchers in the House, who were 
concerned about “socialism” and the encroachment of government on the free market. In 
the first case, the Republicans held a majority, in the second they were in the minority. 
However, the second defection was as consequential as the first, because in 2008 the 
Democratic majority in the House was reluctant to enact the bill without the political 
cover provided by the support of the Republican minority. In effect, the minority party 
held a veto over the enactment; nominally divided government was effectively 
consensual government. 
  These two episodes illustrate several mechanisms that reduce the significance of 
divided government during emergency lawmaking. First, both the public and officialdom 
may experience emotions of genuine solidarity during a crisis, especially in its initial 
stages. A marker of such solidarity is that legislators transcend partisanship, at least 
temporarily. Second, even when the emotion of solidarity gets no purchase among 
hardened officials, public demand for bipartisanship in times of crisis can induce ersatz 
solidarity; fearing that the public will punish any actor who resorts to the open 
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partisanship of normal times, legislators will grit their teeth and behave as though 
motivated by impartial concern for the public interest. Finally, emergencies often 
implicate new policy issues and unforeseen questions of institutional authority, both of 
which tend to cut across frozen partisan cleavages. In the case of the Patriot Act and the 
EESA, fears about civil liberties and economic liberties, or creeping “socialism,” were 
both held by conservative Republicans in the House, while the Republican administration 
took an authoritarian stance on both security issues and economic issues. In those cases 
and also in the case of the September 2001 AUMF, there was evidence of bipartisan 
concern that an excessively broad delegation would overturn the allocation of lawmaking 
power among the branches. Although the latter concern was not sufficiently powerful to 
overcome the political forces favoring broad delegation, it did cause a degree of pushback 
against executive proposals. 
  Schmitt vs. Madison redux. The overall picture of Congress’ role in emergency 
lawmaking, then, is as follows. Congress lacks motivation to act before the crisis, even if 
the crisis is in some sense predictable. Thus the initial administrative response will 
inevitably take place under old statutes of dubious relevance, or under vague emergency 
statutes that imposes guidelines that the executive ignores and that Congress lacks the 
political will to enforce,
79 or under claims of inherent executive authority. After the crisis 
is underway, the executive seeks a massive new delegation of authority and almost 
always obtains some or most of what it seeks, although with modifications of form and of 
degree. When Congress enacts such delegations, it is reacting to the crisis rather than 
anticipating it, and the consequence of delegation is just that the executive once again 
chooses the bulk of new policies for managing the crisis, but with clear statutory 
authority for doing so. 
In this pattern, Congress’s structural incapacities ensure that, while Congress can 
shape and constrain the executive’s response at the margins, it is fundamentally driven by 
events and by executive proposals for coping with those events, rather than seizing 
control of them. Schmitt’s broad claim that the fast-moving conditions of the 
administrative state produce a marginal, reactive, and essentially debilitated Congress, 
whether or not true in normal times, is basically accurate during crises. At a minimum, it 
is closer to the mark than the Madisonian vision of a deliberative legislature that might 
rise to the occasion in times of crises, rather than handing power to the executive and 
hoping for the best. 
The role of the Senate in the EESA’s passage is particularly hard to square with 
the Madisonian view. Far from dampening hasty legislation with a calmly deliberative 
perspective, the Senate played two main roles. The first, a pluralist role, was to lubricate 
the bill’s passage with pork-fat, such as a tax break for producers of wooden arrows (but 
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not plastic ones) intended to gain the support of the Senators from Oregon.
80 The 
Senate’s second role was to put pressure on the House to act even more quickly and to 
approve the new delegation of executive authority. The Senate vote was accelerated by 
Senate leaders in order to approve the bill before the House’s final vote, a move intended 
to underscore the obstructionism of House Republicans and to raise the political costs of 
their resistance.
81 Rather than cooling off the sense of urgency behind the legislation, the 
Senate helped bring it to a boil. 
To be sure, it is difficult to extract from the Madisonian view clear implications or 
predictions about how Congress will or should act during emergencies, in order to 
compare with the facts. Both the Schmittian view and the Madisonian view offer broad 
accounts of political processes and probabilistic tendencies, rather than point predictions. 
The Schmittian view, however, could clearly be falsified by imaginable outcomes. If 
Congress had rejected the bailout bill altogether, or decided to handle mortgage-related 
purchases itself, through its committees – and a great many detailed policy choices and 
appropriations matters were handled in exactly that way during the 19
th century – then the 
Schmittian view would have been falsified. If after 9/11 Congress had adopted a statute 
that restricted the president’s power in future security emergencies,
82 the Schmittian view 
would have been falsified in the security context. By the same token, however, if we are 
right that Congress played a marginal and reactive role during both crises, bucking 
against executive proposals but eventually giving in, griping from the stands, and 
reaching decisions mostly through bargaining rather than deliberation, it is fair to think 
that the Madisonian view does not capture the dynamics of crisis governance. 
D. The Courts 
  As we have addressed the role of the courts in security emergencies at length 
elsewhere,
83 and as courts have not yet made an appearance in the 2008 financial crisis, 
we will offer a briefer account here of their role in economic crises. In either context, 
courts are marginal participants. Here two Schmittian themes are relevant: that courts 
come too late to the crisis to make a real difference in many cases, and that courts have 
pragmatic and political incentives to defer to the executive, whatever the nominal 
standard of review. The largest problem, underlying these mechanisms, is that courts 
possess legal authority but not robust political legitimacy. Legality and legitimacy 
diverge in crisis conditions, and the divergence causes courts to assume a restrained role. 
We take up these points in turn. 
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The timing of review. A basic feature of judicial review in most Anglo-American 
legal systems is that courts rely upon the initiative of private parties to bring suits, which 
the courts then adjudicate as “cases and controversies” rather than as abstract legal 
questions. This means that there is always a time lag, of greater or lesser duration, 
between the adoption of controversial government measures and the issuance of judicial 
opinions on their legal validity. Common lawyers sometimes praise this delayed review 
precisely because the delay ensures that courts are less likely to set precedents while 
crises are hot, precedents that will be warped by the emotions of the day or by the 
political power of aroused majorities.
84 
Delayed review has severe costs, however. For one thing, courts often face a fait 
accompli. Although it is sometimes possible to strangle new programs in the crib, once 
those measures are up and running, it is all the more difficult for courts to order that they 
be abolished. This may be because new measures create new constituencies or otherwise 
entrench themselves, creating a ratchet effect,
85 but the simpler hypothesis is just that 
officials and the public believe that the measures have worked well enough. Most simply, 
returning to the pre-emergency status quo by judicial order seems unthinkable; doing so 
would just re-create the conditions that led the legislature and executive to take 
emergency measures in the first place. 
For another thing, even if courts could overturn or restrict emergency measures, 
by the time their review occurs, those measures will by their nature already have worked, 
or not. If they have worked, or at least if there is a widespread sense that the crisis has 
passed, then the legislators and public may not much care whether the courts invalidate 
the emergency measures after the fact. In the case of the EESA, one legal question we 
have discussed is whether the statute vests the Secretary of the Treasury with so much 
legal authority, without intelligible standards, as to violate the somewhat spectral 
“nondelegation doctrine.” Although the legal claim is not intrinsically strong, the more 
important point is that by the time the courts issue a final pronouncement on the 
challenge, the program will either have increased liquidity and stabilized financial 
markets, or not. In either case, the nondelegation challenge will interest constitutional 
lawyers, but will lack practical significance. 
Intensity of review. Another dimension of review is intensity rather than timing. 
At the level of constitutional law, the overall record is that courts tend to defer heavily to 
the executive in times of crisis, only reasserting themselves once the public sense of 
imminent threat has passed.
86 At the level of administrative law, as to security matters, 
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federal courts deciding cases after 9/11 have tended to defer in a range of important 
cases,
87 although more large-number work is necessary to understand the precise contours 
of the phenomenon. Schmitt occasionally argued that the administrative state would 
actually increase the power of judges, insofar as liberal legislatures would attempt to 
compensate for broad delegations to the executive by creating broad rights of judicial 
review;
88 consider the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which postdates Schmitt’s 
claim. It is entirely consistent with the broader tenor of Schmitt’s thought, however, to 
observe that the very political forces that constrain legislatures to enact broad delegations 
in times of crisis also hamper judges, including judges applying APA-style review. While 
their nominal power of review may be vast, the judges cannot exercise it to the full in 
times of crisis. 
Deference to executives in administrative-law cases can arise in two ways. In the 
first, administrative law creates a “black hole” in which there is no review at all. In the 
second, courts applying flexible standards of review, such as the “arbitrary and 
capricious” test that is a central feature of the APA, create a “grey hole.”
89 In the latter 
case, despite the nominal availability of review, courts dial down the intensity of review 
in ways that are difficult for the Supreme Court or outside observers to check in 
particular cases, although the existence of the phenomenon will be quite obvious in the 
aggregate.
90 
In the framing of the EESA, the same two modes of deference came into play. 
The Secretary’s initial proposal would have excluded review altogether. The final version 
is best read to create standard APA-style review of the Secretary’s actions, if only to 
avoid possible constitutional questions about nondelegation. Although, as we noted 
above, there is some ambiguity about what review the statute actually allows, we will 
indulge the assumptions least favorable to our view by stipulating that ordinary review is 
permitted. 
The problem with APA-style review under the EESA, however, is that, as in other 
areas of administrative law, courts will predictably defer heavily to administrators’ 
particular decisions in times of crisis. Courts do so both because they lack the 
information to second-guess those decisions in the complex circumstances of actual 
cases, and because they fear to be seen to thwart emergency measures. Lower courts, 
especially, are reluctant to challenge the decisions of the President and other high 
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executive officials in matters of national security;
91 quite plausibly, the same will be true 
as to economic emergencies. And the questions at issue in such cases will generally be 
too numerous and too fact-bound for the Supreme Court to review more than a handful of 
them.
92 
Whether or not such deference is desirable in the abstract, the pragmatics of crisis 
governance give courts few alternatives. Consider the idea that courts could review the 
transactions the Secretary undertakes, in particular the prices he accepts at “reverse 
auctions” for mortgage-related securities. If courts subject these transactions to 
meaningful review, then sellers would be afraid that sales would be reversed, and the 
whole idea of the program—to encourage holders of assets to sell—would be 
undermined. If courts subject these transactions to highly deferential review, then review 
would serve little purpose. In any event, it is doubtful that courts could second-guess the 
Secretary’s pricing decisions. The problem is that the mortgage-related asset market has 
collapsed, so there are no market prices to use as a benchmark. And given the likely 
complexity of these transactions, which would involve equity stakes, covenants of 
various sorts, and much else, courts would be in a difficult position if they sought to 
evaluate the transactions in a serious fashion. 
In general, the Secretary’s pricing decisions under the EESA are paradigmatic of 
the types of questions that courts find it difficult to review, involving as they do a 
combination of technicality, uncertainty about valuation, and urgency. The first two 
factors are also present in judicial review of rate regulation of public utilities by 
administrative agencies, which tends to be highly deferential; more broadly, the inability 
of courts to determine utility rates and common-carrier rates, through a succession of 
cases, was a major impetus behind the creation of early administrative agencies.
93 
Beyond the features common with other regulatory schemes in which uncertain valuation 
is a problem, the EESA carries with it an aura of urgency, which will make courts 
reluctant to be seen frustrating the only major statutory mechanism for coping with the 
financial crisis. 
The upshot is that the EESA will, in all probability, create nothing more than a 
series of legal grey holes, rather than genuinely independent judicial oversight. Lawyers, 
who are frequently obsessed with the formal question whether judicial review is 
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technically available or not, may draw comfort from Congress’ decision to provide for 
arbitrariness review. From another perspective, however, legal grey holes may be worse 
than legal black ones. The former create an illusion of oversight, whereas the latter are in 
a sense more candid about whether meaningful review will in fact occur.
94 Our 
perspective is that it is not useful to talk about whether black or grey holes are preferable. 
Some mix of both types is inevitable where statutes like the AUMF, Patriot Act and the 
EESA delegate administrative power to cope with an emergency. Background legalist 
statutes like the APA are themselves shot through with exceptions and qualifications that 
allow the standard pattern of crisis management to proceed without real check.   
Legality and legitimacy. At a higher level of abstraction, the basic problem 
underlying judicial review of emergency measures is the divergence between the courts’ 
legal powers and their political legitimacy in times of perceived crisis. As Schmitt 
pointed out, emergency measures can be “exceptional” in the sense that although illegal, 
or of dubious legality, they may nonetheless be politically legitimate, if they respond to 
the public’s sense of the necessities of the situation.
95 Domesticating this point and 
applying it to the practical operation of the administrative state, courts reviewing 
emergency measures may be on strong legal ground, but will tend to lack the political 
legitimacy needed to invalidate emergency legislation or the executive’s emergency 
regulations. Anticipating this, courts pull in their horns.  
When the public sense of crisis passes, legality and legitimacy will once again 
pull in tandem; courts then have more freedom to invalidate emergency measures, but it 
is less important whether or not they do so, as the emergency measure will in large part 
have already worked, or not. The precedents set after the sense of crisis has passed may 
be calmer and more deliberative, and thus of higher epistemic quality – this is the claim 
of the common lawyers, which resembles an application of the Madisonian vision to the 
courts – but the public will not take much notice of those precedents, and they will have 
little sticking power when the next crisis rolls around. 
E. Other Oversight Mechanisms 
  In emergency lawmaking, Congress routinely attaches strings to its delegations in 
the form of reporting provisions, sunset provisions, and a variety of other oversight 
mechanisms. Such provisions often amount to less than meet the eye. Reporting 
provisions – used in the AUMF, the Patriot Act, and the EESA – embody both a concern 
that Congress should be informed and also an elevated theory that transparency will 
promote democratic accountability. Yet in practice such provisions notoriously end up 
leveling forests to create massive documents that few people ever read. 
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Both the Patriot Act and the EESA contain sunset provisions.
96 The main theory 
of such provisions is that by creating a future reversion to the legal status quo ante the 
delegation, the sunset will make it easier to claw back new powers from the executive if a 
future Congress judges that the emergency has passed; the future Congress can do so 
simply by declining to re-enact the new powers, rather than having to affirmatively 
overturn them by a new statute, which could itself be vetoed.
97 In practice, however, the 
difference between emergency statutes with and without sunsets is often small, for 
political reasons. When controversial provisions of the Patriot Act came up for renewal in 
2005, the provisions were twice continued on a short-term basis while the administration 
played chicken with Democratic and Republican civil libertarians in the Senate, betting 
that legislators would not be willing to let the provisions lapse altogether. In the end, 
minor adjustments were made, but the bulk of the provisions were re-enacted, some 
permanently.
98 
  The EESA follows a broadly similar pattern to the Patriot Act by creating 
checking and monitoring mechanisms whose force is at best unclear. We will pass over 
the statute’s reporting requirements and its sunset clause, to focus on two mechanisms of 
greater interest. The first involves periodic review by Congress itself, the second involves 
oversight by an independent board. 
  Congressional review. In the first mechanism, the EESA provides that the 
Secretary’s last $350 billion (!) in purchasing authority is subject to a “joint resolution” 
of disapproval.
99 The theory of the provision is to secure review by a future Congress, 
akin to a sunset clause (which the EESA also contains). Yet this mechanism requires 
affirmative action by the future Congress, or at least a credible threat of such action; as 
such, it seems even less likely than a sunset clause to result in a real check on the 
executive. A joint resolution is just a statute by another name, so the disapproval would 
have to obtain a congressional supermajority in order to override a veto. The provision is 
not completely meaningless – for one thing, it waives complex internal legislative 
procedures and thus places the disapproval on a fast track – yet this does nothing to cure 
the basic problem. Similar statutes that require affirmative congressional action to check 
the executive, such as the National Emergencies Act, have tended to become dead 
letters.
100 One may safely predict the same here. 
Independent boards. The EESA also creates oversight by a putatively independent 
board, the “Financial Stability Oversight Board,” which consists of the Secretary himself, 
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the Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (an independent 
commission recently created in other legislation), and the Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development.
101 Of these five, three are chairs or heads of “independent 
agencies,” whose principals cannot be fired without cause, and this suffices to create a 
patina of independent oversight. In the case of the SEC, there is some degree of legal 
uncertainty about the independence of the commission, in part because the D.C. Circuit 
recently issued an expansive interpretation of the grounds for firing permitted by the 
statute.
102 So one might describe the EESA as creating a Board consisting of two-and-a-
half independent agencies and two-and-a-half executive agencies -- another display of 
Congress’ Solomonic wisdom. 
However this may be, the aura of independence fades quickly when one considers 
the Board’s powers and the actual conduct of its members. The Board is authorized to 
“review[] the exercise of [the Secretary’s powers],” to ensure that the Secretary is 
carrying out the purposes and policies of the statute, to recommend action to the 
Secretary, and to send reports to appropriate congressional committees.
103 These 
provisions are another exercise in “studied ambiguity.”
104 Their scope and force is vague, 
the crux of the ambiguity being whether the Board has power to actually countermand the 
Secretary’s purchasing decisions and other orders, or whether its power to “review” 
simply amounts to a power to find out what the Secretary is up to and transmit 
information to Congress. The highminded interpretation is that Congress declined to give 
the Board clearly controlling authority because of lurking constitutional questions about 
whether the powers of a “core” executive agency like the Treasury could be subjected to 
independent control, even under the Court’s latitudinarian precedents.
105 The lowminded 
interpretation is that legislators benefitted politically by creating an oversight mechanism 
whose atmospherics suggest independent supervision of the Secretary’s massive new 
powers, but whose operational reality is far less impressive. 
Even if the Board had crystal-clear legal power to actually countermand the 
Secretary’s decisions, a separate problem is whether the Board would in practice function 
as an autonomous check on the Secretary’s extraordinary economic authority. The answer 
is likely to be no. Even before the EESA was enacted, the chair of the Fed, Ben 
Bernanke, acted hand in glove with the Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, with the latter 
in the role of lead partner. Part of the explanation here is that independent agencies face 
the same problems of legality and legitimacy that plague independent judiciaries in times 
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of crisis. Lacking a direct channel of accountability to the President, they are partially 
insulated from politics, but are also vulnerable to criticism as “unelected bureaucrats.”  
Moreover, recent empirical work suggests that the heads of independent agencies 
and executive agencies tend to have common preferences and beliefs, both aligned with 
those of the reigning President; at least this is especially likely to be so late in the second 
term of an eight-year Presidency.
106 If this is correct, it is because the growing 
polarization of the political parties ensures that Presidents can reliably select and appoint 
independent agency heads whose preferences and views track their own. While a Senate 
dominated by the other party can slow down the rate of such appointments, and thus 
delay the time when Presidents take control of the independent agencies, eventually 
Presidents can do a great deal to coordinate all agency heads on common preferences and 
a common program, whatever their nominal legal status. 
F. The Self-Fulfilling Crisis of Authority 
Finally, we mention a dynamic that further tightens the political constraints in 
times of crisis. Precisely because markets expected the House to pass the EESA, its initial 
failure to do so created a perceived “crisis of authority,”
107 suggesting a risk that 
dysfunctional political institutions would not be able to coordinate on any economic 
policy at all. That second-order crisis supervened on the underlying economic crisis, but 
acquired force independent of it. The Senate had to scramble to undo the damage and did 
so in world-record time. The House quickly fell into line. 
In this way, measures urged by the executive to cope with a crisis of unclear 
magnitude acquired a kind of self-created momentum. Rejection of those measures would 
themselves create a political crisis that might, in turn, reduce confidence and thus trigger 
or exacerbate the underlying financial crisis. A similar process occurred in the debates 
over the AUMF and the Patriot Act, where proponents of the bills urged that their 
rejection would send terrorist groups a devastating signal about American political unity 
and will, thereby encouraging more attacks. These political dynamics, in short, create a 
self-fulfilling crisis of authority that puts legislative institutions under tremendous 
pressure to accede to executive demands, at least where a crisis is even plausibly alleged. 
Critics of executive power contend that the executive exploits its focal role during 
crises in order to bully and manipulate Congress, defeating Madisonian deliberation when 
it is most needed.
108 On an alternative account, the legislature rationally submits to 
executive leadership because a crisis can be addressed only by a leader. Enemies are 
emboldened by institutional conflict or a divided government; financial markets are 
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spooked by it.
109 A government riven by internal conflict will produce policy that varies 
as political coalitions rise and fall. Inconsistent policies can be exploited by enemies and 
they generate uncertainty at a time that financial markets are especially sensitive to 
agents’ predictions of future government action. It is a peculiar feature of the 2008 
financial crises that a damaged president could not fulfill the necessary leadership role, 
but that role quickly devolved to the Treasury Secretary and Fed Chair who, acting in 
tandem, have not once expressed disagreement publicly. 
***** 
The basic similarity between the two episodes of emergency lawmaking, in 2001 
and 2008, is somewhat obscured by the Sturm und Drang that accompanied the EESA’s 
passage. Election-year politics exacerbated the political turmoil, but the Houses’ initial 
rejection of the EESA resembled the revolt of civil-libertarian Republican back-benchers 
in the debate over the Patriot Act, just on a larger scale. Broadly speaking, the final result 
was strikingly similar: the executive got the core of its requested new power, with a few 
oversight mechanisms of uncertain force, including a remote future prospect of judicial 
review. Overall, the EESA, like the AUMF and the Patriot Act before it, exemplifies the 
usual outcome of Schmittian crisis management, albeit with some important contextual 
differences. We now turn to those differences. 
III. Variations in Crisis Governance 
  The Schmittian view, even if correct, should not be understood to make point 
predictions about how any particular crisis will be resolved. Rather, it supplies a 
framework that helps to identify broad political constraints. What explains variations in 
crisis governance, within the constraints? In this Part, we both detail the differences 
between crisis governance in the two cases, and consider several explanations for those 
differences. 
Critics of executive aggrandizement objected more loudly in 2001 than in 2008, 
but it is hard to measure the practical differences between the two cases. The executive’s 
actions after 9/11 might seem more conspicuous and dramatic, but it is not clear that 
those actions—immigrant sweeps, profiling, detentions, even war—were more extreme 
than the government’s intervention in financial markets, which involved the near-
nationalization of a multi-trillion dollar industry.
110 The main differences lie in law and 
rhetoric. After 9/11 the administration more clearly stretched or defied existing statutes—
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ignoring FISA and the anti-torture statute, for example—than it did during the financial 
crisis, and it made more aggressive arguments about its constitutional authority. In the 
9/11 crisis, it invoked the commander-in-chief and vesting clauses of Article II of the 
Constitution; in the financial crisis, the Bush administration made no constitutional 
arguments. 
  We examine four explanations of these differences. 
A. The Madisonian View Revisited: Formal Law 
One possible explanation for these differences reverts back to the formal legal 
setting. On this theory, one set of legal rules governs security crises and another set of 
legal rules governs financial crises, and the security-crisis rules give the executive more 
authority to act unilaterally than the financial-crisis rules do. A variant of this theory is 
that there are special security-crisis rules but no financial-crisis rules: the executive’s 
authority in financial crises is no greater than its authority during normal times. Where 
the Bush administration had adequate authority, it acted; where it did not, it sought the 
necessary authority.  
This account cannot be the whole story. On the one hand, the Bush administration 
did stretch its statutory authorizations in both cases, perhaps violating some of them, so 
as to engage in actions that it thought necessary, although there was an important 
difference of degree. The NSA surveillance program and the administration’s 
interrogation practices were in tension with statutes. The Fed’s bailout of AIG was as 
well; the relevant statute authorized loans only, while the transaction was probably a 
purchase. On the other hand, the administration sought Congressional authorization, in 
both cases, for actions that it believed, or could have believed, were already lawful. The 
administration probably did not need the AUMF in order to launch an attack on 
Afghanistan, and it has never conceded that the statute was necessary. And the 
administration, acting through the Fed, could probably have bought up mortgage-related 
assets as necessary; it did not need statutory authorization to borrow, and could have 
borrowed hundreds of billions, even trillions, of dollars in order to buy those assets or the 
institutions that owned them. 
  In terms of formal written law, embodied in the Constitution and statutes, the 
difference between the two types of crises is small. The U.S. Constitution, unlike many 
foreign constitutions, has no explicit provisions for emergencies that give the executive 
heightened power. It does have a rule that grants Congress the authority to suspend 
habeas corpus during security crises only (rebellion or invasion),
111 but Congress did not 
use that authority during the 9/11 crisis. A host of statutes address security and financial 
emergencies, but these statutes by definition embody Congressional authorization, so 
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their existence cannot explain why the Bush administration stretched or violated statutes 
to a greater extent during the 9/11 crisis than during the financial crisis. 
  In terms of constitutional practice, the story is more complicated. In nearly every 
major war or security emergency since the founding, the executive has claimed broad 
powers to respond—in some cases violating statutes, in other cases violating 
constitutional rules that apply during normal times.
112 Frequently noted examples include 
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, Wilson’s crackdown on wartime dissenters, and 
FDR’s internment of Japanese-Americans. These and other precedents have given rise to 
a vigorous and controversial executive-branch jurisprudence of executive power that 
draws on the commander-and-chief and vesting clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and 
various judicial opinions that recognize the executive’s primacy in foreign relations.
113 
The Bush administration drew on this traditional jurisprudence in the course of justifying 
its narrow interpretations of FISA and other statutes that stood in the way of its war-on-
terror tactics. 
  Precedent for emergency powers during financial crises is equally abundant. 
Consider FDR’s first inaugural address in 1933, where he vaguely hinted that he might 
need dictatorial powers in order to address the Great Depression: 
It is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority 
may be wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be 
that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for 
temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure. 
I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a 
stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or 
such other measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, 
I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption. 
But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and 
in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear 
course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one 
remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power to wage a war 
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were 
in fact invaded by a foreign foe.
114 
FDR acknowledged that he would ask for, rather than seize, dictatorial powers. But the 
request would come only in the event that Congress failed to cooperate in the first place, 
leading one to wonder what might be the implied consequence if the request were turned 
down. And even if Congress were to grant FDR dictatorial powers, there would be no 
source for such a measure in the Constitution. 
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  However one interprets FDR’s address, Congress did cooperate with his 
legislative program, so his constitutional theory was never tested. In addition, the Great 
Depression in 1933 was far more serious than the financial crisis of 2008, which was 
more like 1929, when credit had frozen up but layoffs had not yet begun, than 1933, 
when a quarter of the workforce was unemployed, millions of people lived in 
shantytowns and roamed the roads, and there were sparks of revolutionary anger. No 
such conditions existed in 2008, so FDR’s speech does not offer even a weak precedent. 
Therefore, the Bush administration had no basis for claiming unilateral emergency 
powers to address a financial crisis. 
  Differences in constitutional law and practice, then, might explain why the Bush 
administration acted more forcefully after 9/11 than during the financial crisis. A related 
point is that Congress had delegated broader authority to address financial crises than 
security crises. The Fed has enormous discretionary authority, as does Treasury, and the 
two institutions had used that authority to intervene in the credit market and rescue 
institutions long before the crisis of September 2008 occurred. By contrast, Congress had 
given the executive less explicit authority to counter military threats prior to 9/11. It had 
enacted a few emergency statutes with limited scope and it had acquiesced in much 
overseas military activity without attempting to regulate it.
115 But it had imposed 
numerous constraints on law enforcement, intelligence, and military activities at home, 
where the threat posed by Al Qaida would become manifest.  Thus, the Bush 
administration may have felt less need to claim constitutional sources of authority in the 
financial crisis than in the security crisis. 
  As noted above, however, the legal differences do not adequately explain the 
different approaches of the Bush administration to the two crises. It made aggressive 
statutory arguments in both crises, and it did go to some trouble to obtain legal 
authorization in the 9/11 crisis. A full explanation for the differences in approach must lie 
elsewhere. 
B. Magnitude and Nature of the Crisis 
Another explanation for the greater aggressiveness of the Bush administration 
after 9/11 than during the financial crisis is that the nature of the threat was different. On 
this view, the security crisis posed a threat to life and bodily integrity and to the 
economy, which depends on transportation and other facilities threatened by terrorists; 
the financial crisis posed a threat to prosperity and financial well-being.
 116 The security 
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crisis did not have any real precedent and shattered expectations about how the 
government can handle security threats; the financial crisis followed a long line of similar 
cyclical downturns. The security crisis required a response that would necessarily involve 
coercion and violence, including limitations on civil liberty; the financial crisis required a 
response that involved no more than shuffling money around. In sum, the stakes were 
higher after 9/11 than they were in 2008, and that explains why the Bush administration 
acted differently in the two crises. 
  This theory has a number of vulnerabilities. The relevant consideration is not 
whether the 9/11 attacks killed people or caused more economic harm than the failure of 
AIG and other firms in 2008; the relevant consideration is what these visible events tell 
us about the future. The 9/11 attacks implied further and possibly worse terrorist attacks 
in the future, including a nuclear attack, but no one could assign a probability to these 
worst-case events. The financial crisis implied further and possibly worse failures, with 
the worst case a Great-Depression style economic collapse. Both worst-case scenarios are 
major catastrophes; beyond that, little can be said about which set of events revealed a 
greater threat to people’s well-being. 
  Moreover, while it is true that people have a visceral reaction to government 
actions that infringe on liberties, this point cuts against the claim that the Bush 
administration’s more aggressive posture in the security crisis can be explained by 
reference to the nature of the crisis. In the view of the executive branch, the security crisis 
necessitated a government response that involved violence; the financial crisis 
necessitated a government response that did not involve violence. It was easy to 
anticipate that people would be more concerned about the violation of civil liberties than 
about increasing government debt. So the visceral reaction to infringement on liberties 
should have resulted in greater caution by the government after 9/11 rather than less, and 
hence greater eagerness to enlist Congress’s help, compared to the financial crisis. Yet 
the opposite occurred. 
  Another theory is that the Bush administration needed Congress during the 
financial crisis because ultimately only Congress has the authority to appropriate funds to 
pay off the massive debts that the executive branch was incurred on behalf of the United 
States; without a signal of congressional support, creditors would fear that the debt might 
not be paid off, which would undermine the government’s efforts to calm fears and 
reassure creditors. By contrast, military activity is the prerogative of the executive. 
However, Congress would ultimately have to pay the bills for the 9/11 response as well. 
In both cases, congressional support would strengthen the policies of the executive by 
making clear that those policies would survive short-term political turnover; for this 
reason, the executive rationally sought congressional support in both crises. 
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  In sum, differences in the magnitude and nature of the crisis do not explain 
differences in the Bush administration’s responses. 
C. The Psychology of Crisis 
A recurrent theme in discussions of crisis lawmaking is the role of fear. A 
standard account holds that during crises, public fear, or fear among legislators, causes 
those legislators to put their faith in the executive, and hence both to delegate power to it 
and to acquiesce when the executive claims new powers.
117 Public fear during the 9/11 
crisis accounts for the Bush administration’s unilateralism at the time; by contrast, fear 
was muted during the financial crisis and hence the opportunity for exercising executive 
power was more limited. 
  To evaluate this argument, we must start with the idea of fear. Fear is sometimes 
used as a synonym for rational apprehension of a heightened threat, but in public debate 
fear usually refers to the tendency to overreact in response to a threat, compared to some 
baseline of rational action.
118 Critics of the Bush administration believe that the public 
would have been better off with a less aggressive reaction to the terrorist attacks but 
supported the more aggressive action because of their fear. 
  Was there more fear after 9/11 than during the financial crisis? This question is 
virtually impossible to answer. Certainly, fear was widespread after 9/11, and many 
people stopped flying on airplanes, as a result. In the government, officials clearly felt 
fear as well. During the financial crisis, the general public was less fearful, although there 
was certainly a general level of anxiety. However, knowledgeable people—traders, 
executives, government officials—clearly felt fear.
119 Indeed, the common phrase 
“financial panic” clearly signifies the role of fear in financial crises. A difference in the 
level of fear does not have much explanatory power. 
  Both crises generated another emotion—outrage and a thirst for vengeance. A 
crucial distinction is that during the 9/11 crisis, the outrage was directed (mostly) 
outward, to Al Qaida members and their supporters who lived mainly in foreign 
countries. During the financial crisis, the outrage was directed internally, at Wall Street 
financiers and government officials. As a result, the 9/11 crisis generated (temporary) 
political unity, while the financial crisis generated a populist backlash against the rich, 
and division between the country’s elites and its public. It may be that the executive has a 
freer hand when public unity exists than otherwise. However, it is not clear why this 
should be so. If the public is unified, Congress should support the executive, in which 
case unilateralism become less necessary. 
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  This brings us to our final point, which is the indeterminacy of theories based on 
fear and other emotions.
120 A threat to security generates fear; but the fear could be 
directed at the external enemy, leading to a transfer of power to the executive, or the fear 
could be directed at the possibility of executive abuse of its powers, leading to imposition 
of limits on the executive, at least compared to the rational baseline. Similarly, a financial 
threat could lead to fear of economic collapse, or fear of abusive government action that 
exploits the crisis—leading to transfer of power to the executive if the first alternative is 
correct, and the imposition of limits on the executive if the second alternative is correct. 
Moreover, both effects could operate simultaneously, but in different directions, with 
unclear consequences overall. 
  Still, we can see some merit in the following conjecture. The 9/11 security threat 
generated fear of further attacks and outrage against an external threat, both of which led 
to greater confidence in the government and especially the executive branch, which 
traditionally has primary responsibility for repelling external threats. The financial crisis 
of 2008 generated fear of economic collapse, but also outrage directed both at wealthy 
elites and at the government that was supposed to regulate them. The distrust of the 
government and the division among Americans partly explains why the executive could 
not act as aggressively as it did after 9/11. We will develop this point in Section D. 
D. Credibility and Popularity of Government Officials 
  Another theory is that the Bush administration could act more aggressively during 
the 9/11 crisis than during the financial crisis because it was more popular and had more 
credibility. People felt they could trust the administration with authority to engage in 
operations that would often be secret by necessity; secret behavior, or behavior that is 
based on hard-to-observe or hard-to-evaluate information, would also be necessary 
during the financial crisis but the administration could no longer be trusted. This theory 
rests on several important distinctions between the political and institutional context of 
the 9/11 crisis and the financial crisis. 
  First, the Bush administration was more popular on 9/11 than it was in September, 
2008. Bush’s approval ratings ranged from 50 to 60 percent prior to 9/11; they shot up 
into the 80 percent range after 9/11. By contrast, Bush’s approval rating was in the 30 
percent rage just prior to the financial crisis, and collapsed at its onset.
121 A popular 
executive can bully Congress; an unpopular executive cannot. 
  Second, the Bush administration was more trusted on 9/11 than it was in 
September, 2008. In 9/11, the Bush administration was still an unknown quantity; it had 
whatever trust an untried presidency has, marred by the controversial 2000 election. In 
2008, the Bush administration had lost a great deal of its credibility as a result of its false 
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statements prior to the Iraq War and various political scandals.
122 The Bush 
administration’s efforts to enhance executive power by making broad legal claims about 
the basis of executive power in the Constitution backfired; whatever the merits of the 
legal claims, people feared executive aggrandizement, and Congress and the courts 
fought back by asserting their own institutional prerogatives.
123 In late 2008, legal claims 
resting on inherent executive power would have fallen on deaf ears. 
Third, on 9/11 Republicans controlled the House and almost half the Senate; they 
were in the ascendancy after a long period during which they had a subordinate position 
in a divided government. In September 2008, Democrats controlled both houses and the 
Republican brand had lost its luster. Although the 2008 Congress was extremely 
unpopular—even more unpopular than Congress in 2001
124—it also had greater 
confidence in itself and greater reason to oppose the Bush administration, which would 
accordingly need to act with greater care. 
  Finally, it was harder to blame Bush administration officials for 9/11 than for the 
financial crisis of 2008. On 9/11, Bush had been in office for less than one year, so much 
of the failure to prevent the crisis had to be attributed to his predecessor. In addition, the 
9/11 attacks came out of the blue; it is not clear that they could have been foreseen and 
prevented.
125 By contrast, in 2008, Bush administration officials had been in office for 
almost eight years. While the roots of the financial crisis can be found in decisions made 
in the 1990s, regulatory oversight since then was the responsibility of the Bush 
administration and it had failed. 
  However, there is an important countervailing consideration. So far, we have 
referred to the Bush administration as the main protagonist, and this is correct for the 
9/11 crisis. But the financial crisis involved a more complex institutional response. The 
Fed is an independent agency and not directly under the control of the White House. In 
addition, it enjoys a very high level of confidence. The Fed’s Chairman, Ben Bernanke, 
was highly regarded. Indeed, the reputation of the Fed prior to the crisis in 2008 was far 
more impressive than that of the Bush administration prior to 9/11. 
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  Bernanke probably believed that the Fed did not have enough resources, legal 
authority, and political backing, to undertake the necessary response to the crisis by itself. 
It did not have enough assets, and it would need the Treasury’s acquiescence in order to 
borrow more. Its legal authority was expansive but probably not sufficient, and by 
tradition it tried to limit itself to providing funds, rather than buying institutions or exotic 
securities. In any event, it would have to cooperate with other agencies such as Treasury, 
the SEC, and the FDIC, which had considerable authority over large parts of the financial 
system, and these institutions could be coordinated only through the executive branch. So 
the Bush administration’s lack of credibility hampered the Fed as well. 
  Cutting against these points, the Bush administration had a Nixon-in-China 
advantage during the financial crisis of 2008 that it lacked in 2001. The lore has it that 
only Nixon, a hawkish, anti-communist Republican, could establish diplomatic relations 
with China because his conservative reputation rendered credible his claim that a 
relationship with China served the national interest; a Democrat would be suspected of 
being soft on national security.
126 Generalizing, presidents can most assertively use their 
powers in a way that cuts against the grain of the president’s ideological disposition.
127 
On this theory, Bush could not be trusted with military power because he was not known 
as a civil libertarian, but he could be trusted with economic power because no one 
thought he had any desire to nationalize the financial sector. As we have seen, however, 
events do not bear out this theory, perhaps because Bush did in fact expand the federal 
government during his two terms, and had already become known as a big-government 
Republican. 
  To sum up, the weakened position of the Bush administration may account for its 
less aggressive stance in the fall of 2008. The minimal public role of President Bush 
himself supports this thesis. But Congress did not take up the slack. Leadership was 
provided by a duumvirate consisting of Bernanke and Paulson, an awkward executive 
branch-independent agency alliance, which, however, acted as one. 
E. Voters and Cross-Border Effects 
  We noted above that the 9/11 attacks generated outrage that was mostly directed 
toward foreigners, while the financial crisis generated outrage toward a subset of 
Americans. Here, we expand on this point, focusing not on the emotional valence of the 
response, but its political economy. 
  The response to the 9/11 attacks would necessarily involve coercion by security 
personnel, whether law enforcement, immigration, or military. Such actions would 
infringe on, or threaten, rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. However, the victims 
of these actions would mostly be foreigners. Although the administration claimed the 
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right to detain and kill Americans who belong to Al Qaida as well, this claim raised 
hackles and was rarely acted upon. 
  By contrast, the response to the financial crisis would mainly take the form of 
taking money from some Americans (taxpayers) and giving it to other Americans (those 
with interests in institutions that own mortgage backed securities and related assets). In 
the best case, taxpayers would gain more than they lose, but the best case was hardly 
certain. Thus, actions taken to resolve the financial crisis would necessarily create 
divisions among Americans. This may be why the Paulson bill, AUMF-like in its 
simplicity, never stood a chance. The Dodd Bill and then the Senate bill that was passed 
had hundreds more pages that ensured that the constituents of members of Congress were 
paid off with dozens of transfers that were remotely or not at all related to the financial 
crisis. 
  If the most plausible response to the 9/11 attacks would benefit Americans 
generally, by enhancing security, and come at the expense of non-Americans, then it may 
well have been rational for Americans to disregard traditional political checks on the 
executive. Under the circumstances, it was less likely than usual for the executive to use 
its enhanced powers against political opponents. By contrast, many if not most 
Americans believed that any government response to the financial crisis would involve 
redistributing wealth, and so they looked to Congress to defend their interests. 
  This story is appealing and may have elements of the truth. However, every 
government action is redistributive; the 9/11 response had different effects on Muslim 
Americans and on other Americans. It had different effects on people who lived in cities 
and on those who did not, and on people who traveled on airplanes and on those who did 
not. Complaints would soon arise that the newly created Department of Homeland 
Security issued grants on a political basis. A powerful executive has as many 
opportunities to make transfers among voters during security emergencies as during 
financial crises. Accordingly, potential American victims of executive overreach existed 
in both crises, and these Americans would resist executive aggrandizement in both crises. 
  Still, as a matter of public perception, the 9/11 response seemed more like a 
traditional military response against an external enemy that had struck a blow against the 
United States and posed a threat to everyone at home, while the response to the financial 
crisis was not directed against an external enemy, but instead seemed to benefit foreign 
and American financial elites who had harmed ordinary Americans and now stood to gain 
from those same Americans’ expense.
128 In the latter set of circumstances, the executive 
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would need to work harder to reassure Americans that it acted in their interests, and 
enlisting Congressional support was an essential aspect of this effort. 
Conclusion 
  From our comparison of the two crises, we draw two conclusions. First, both 
crises support the Schmittian view over the Madisonian view. Congress can neither 
anticipate crises with statutory structures that provide the executive with properly limited 
authority to address the threat, nor legislate after the crisis in a fashion that appropriately 
regulates the executive. Beforehand, legislatures lack the information and motivation 
needed to provide for the crisis in advance. After the crisis begins, legislatures lack time, 
information, and the institutional mechanisms that are necessary for useful deliberation.  
They can only provide broad support to the executive. If they do not, they can only make 
the crisis worse. Rational legislators hold their noses and delegate power even when they 
do not trust the executive and disagree with its ideological disposition or announced 
policies. The broad delegations use vague standards that frustrate judicial review ex post. 
  Second, the executive will nonetheless have an interest in enlisting congressional 
support. Congressional support can enhance the credibility of the executive’s policies.
129 
The Bush administration cooperated more with Congress during the 2008 financial crisis 
than during the 2001 security crisis because the administration’s credibility had eroded in 
the meantime and the public’s reaction to the financial crisis, which could be blamed on 
some Americans, was more divided than its reaction to the terrorist attacks. Congress 
acquiesced in both instances, giving the administration what it wanted but extracting 
mostly unrelated transfers in return. 
  We have examined only two crises and it is dangerous to generalize. However, 
the pattern of congressional and judicial deference to the executive during wartime 
emergencies has been extensively studied and confirmed.
130 A thorough study of 
financial crises must await future work, but a few comments are appropriate here. 
  In the twentieth century, there have been numerous financial crises
131 but two 
stand out for their magnitude: the bank panic of 1907, when the stock market fell by 37 
percent, and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 1907 bank panic was distinguished 
by the absence of government leadership: the executive had no power to regulate banks; 
Congress did not act either. Into this vacuum stepped J.P. Morgan, the leading investment 
banker of the time, who arranged for a private consortium to inject liquidity into the 
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banking system and stave off collapse. The lesson was not that private citizens could be 
relied on or that next time Congress would speedily provide needed authority, but that 
weak administrative institutions were unacceptable. Policymakers instituted a series of 
reforms that led to the Federal Reserve System, which was given broad discretionary 
authority to respond to financial crises.
132 
  This turned out to be insufficient. The Fed dithered in response to the crash of 
1929, and confidence was not restored until Roosevelt came to office, declared a bank 
holiday, and compelled Congress to pass the Emergency Banking Act. (It took Congress 
eight hours to pass this bill.)
133 Although New Deal economic policies may have 
exacerbated the Great Depression, Roosevelt’s charismatic leadership helped restore 
confidence in the financial system and ensured that economic collapse did not result in 
political strife as it did in so many other countries. New Deal legislation delegated 
unprecedented power to the executive, and Roosevelt used it aggressively to maintain 
order at home, despite an economic and political crisis that lasted a decade.
134 The pattern 
of a strong executive with primacy during financial crises was established, and it has 
lasted to this day. It is the normal mode of crisis governance in the administrative state. 
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